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Abstract 
In an age where the world is often described as interconnected, 
borderless or more participative than ever, assuming that cross-border TV 
networks and ICTs have finally brought the democratic human potential to an 
unprecedented level is an undemanding effort at best. Although there are proofs 
that the production of information is done by more actors than ever, many 
scholars find that suggestion untimely optimistic. Building on that, this paper 
differentiates global markets, borderless communication technologies, 
transnational conglomerates and a global culture of consumption that make up 
the “globalized world” from an inclusive and participative transnational public 
sphere. The paper will argue that questions on inclusiveness of the debate and 
the use of this “debate” as a tool of self-legitimation problematize any 
transnational public sphere.  
To illustrate that, the summit on Eurozone debt crisis that took place on 
7-9 December 2011 in Brussels and it’s coverage on four cross-border news 
televisions will be analyzed. The news items aired on Euronews English, BBC 
World News, CNN International and Al-Jazeera English on the summit will be 
subject to a comparative discourse analysis in regards to who gets to join to 
these discussions? Is the discussion has a chance of influencing political 
decision-making? The paper will argue that the analyzed news networks’ claim 
as being “global” or “cosmopolitan” becomes highly questionable with the 
detection of exclusionary discursive elements in their reporting of this event. 
Finally, the paper will also inquire the limitations of news narrative practices on 
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24 hours news televisions in an effort to discuss any further if the transnational 
public sphere at hand is blocking some groups’ access to representation and 
decision-making or not. 
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Özet 
Sınırların ortadan kalktığı, bağlantıların arttığı ve daha önce görülmemiş 
bir katılımcılığın tanımladığı söylenen bir dönemde sınırötesi TV kanallarının 
ve bilgi ve iletişim teknolojilerinin insanın demokratik potansiyelini nihayet 
görülmemiş bir seviyeye yükselttiğini iddia etmek en iyi ihtimalle kolay bir 
çaba olarak adlandırılabilir. Enformasyon üretiminin birden çok kaynak 
tarafından yapıldığına dair kanıtlar olsa da bu öneriyi zamansız olarak 
nitelemek mümkündür. Bu çalışma küresel finansal pazarlar, sınırların 
bulunmadığı iletişim teknolojileri, ulusötesi şirketler ve küresel tüketim 
kültürünün oluşturduğu “küresel dünyayı” kapsayıcı ve katılımcı bir ulusötesi 
kamusal alandan ayırmaktadır. Tez, barındırdığı tartışmaların kapsayıcılığı ve 
bu tartışmaların kendini meşrulaştırma amaçlı kullanılmasının ulusötesi 
kamusal alanı sorunlu bir hale getirdiğini savunmaktadır.  
Bunu göstermek için 7-9 Aralık 2011’de Brüksel’de gerçekleştirilen 
Euro bölgesi mali krizi zirvesinin 4 uluslararası haber kanalındaki yayını 
incelenmiştir. Euronews English, BBC World News, CNN International ve Al-
Jazeera English’de yayınlanan zirveyle ilgili haberler eleştirel söylem analizine 
tabi tutulmuş ve söz konusu tartışmalara kimin dahil olabildiği ve tartışmaların 
siyasi karar alma mekanizmalarını etkileme olasılığı sorgulanmıştır. Tez, 
incelenen haber kanallarının küresel ya da kozmopolit olma iddialarının haber 
söylemlerindeki dışlayıcı öğeler nedeniyle sorgulanabilir olduğunu ileri 
sürmektedir. Ayrıca, haber kanallarındaki haber anlatım pratiklerinin 
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sınırlayıcılığı da göz önünde bulundurulmuş ve ulusötesi kamusal alanın bazı 
grupların bu alanda temsiliyetlerinin engellenmesine ve karar alımına katılıp 
katılmadıklarına bakılmıştır. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
In an age where the world is often described as interconnected, 
borderless or more participative than ever, assuming that cross-border TV 
networks and ICTs have finally brought the democratic human potential to an 
unprecedented level is an undemanding effort at best. Although there are proofs 
that the production of information is done by more actors than ever, many 
scholars find that suggestion untimely optimistic. Building on that, this paper 
differentiates global markets, borderless communication technologies, 
transnational conglomerates and a global culture of consumption that make up 
the “globalized world” from an inclusive and participative transnational public 
sphere.  
The paper will argue that questions on inclusiveness of the debate 
(Fraser) and the use of this “debate” as a tool of self-legitimation (Mihelj) 
problematize any transnational public sphere. To illustrate that, the summit on 
Eurozone debt crisis that took place on 7-9 December 2011 in Brussels and it’s 
coverage on four cross-border television news networks will be analyzed. The 
news items aired on Euronews English, BBC World News, CNN International 
and Al-Jazeera English on the summit will be subject to critical discourse 
analysis in regard to who gets to join to these discussions? Does the discussion 
have a chance of influencing political decision-making? The paper will argue 
that the analyzed news networks’ claim as being “global” or “cosmopolitan” 
becomes highly questionable with the detection of exclusionary discursive 
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elements in their reporting of this event. Finally, the paper will  inquire the 
limitations of news narrative practices on 24-hour news televisions in an effort 
to discuss further if the transnational public sphere at hand is blocking some 
groups’ access to representation and decision-making or not. 
This will be done by first delving into classical Habermesian theory of 
public sphere and then going through the criticisms that he has received and 
subsequently the revisions that he has made into the theory. Discussions on 
globalization, transnationalization and cosmopolitanism is followed by a debate 
on European public sphere. A description of news and dual filter system of 
Thomas Meyer takes place before ending the chapter with an overview of 24-
hour news networks and rolling news mentality. On the methods and 
procedures chapter it will be explained how the research will actually be carried 
out, with the explanation of the chosen method and the actual steps that will be 
taken during the analysis. The next chapter will be the Data Chapter where the 
actual analysis on the data will take place. 
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Chapter II: Literature review 
II.I. Public Sphere Theory  
II.I.I. The theory in detail: What Habermas had for the breakfast?  
Since the translation into english of Jürgen Habermas’ seminal work 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1989, media studies used 
the theory to discuss crises of modernity, democracy and inclusiveness. In his 
work Habermas, by the method of historical comparison investigates changing 
relations between public opinion and political processes. He recounts this, 
firstly, by the advent of capitalism in the UK and Germany in late 18th and 19th 
centuries that coincide with the rise of the mass media and then, by dwelling on 
post-war western liberal democracies. Habermas describes public sphere as “a 
sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes 
itself as the bearer of public opinion.” (Habermas, 1974: 50)  
Public sphere originated around a time when individuals started to come 
together outside of the state apparatus to discuss matters relating to themselves. 
Although the trade and business was a main factor of the public sphere it was 
not the only explanation for this kind of gathering. People necessitated a new 
kind of private to be able to reflect and have an effect on their surroundings 
since religion’s relocalization in the privacy of individuals as the “first area of 
private autonomy” (1974: 51) after the Reformation proved that doing so is 
possibile. Broadly, this socio-cultural change was linked to  
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the growth of urban culture— metropolitan and provincial—as the novel arena 
of a locally organized public life (meeting houses, concert halls, theaters, 
opera houses, lecture halls, museums), to a new infrastructure of social 
communication (the press, publishing companies, and other literary media; the 
rise of a reading public via reading and language societies; subscription 
publishing and lending libraries; improved transportation; and adapted 
centers of sociability like coffeehouses, taverns, and clubs) (Eley: 291) 
Other than the favorable urban infrastructure for such gathering and 
discussions, a whole new understanding of “voluntary association” started at 
the time. This was a need born out of the desire to minimize monarchies’ power 
and separate the public from the ruler which, hitherto, were the same. Before 
that transformation, the court of a monarch was represented “not ‘for’, but 
‘before’ the people” (Habermas, 1989: 8) That kind of court society paved way 
to a new sociability in 18th century salons where bourgeoisie started to play an 
important role. On this issue however, Habermas does not mean to suggest that 
“what made the public sphere bourgeois was simply the class composition of its 
members. Rather, it was society that was bourgeois, and bourgeois society 
produced a certain form of public sphere” (Calhoun, 1992: 7) 
This new public of private individuals, by joining in the rational critical 
debate gradually broke the monarchs’ right to represent. “Officially regulated 
intellectual newspapers” was the first medium that’s been used by the bourgeois 
public sphere against the authorities. Institutions of sociability (such as 
coffeehouses) and discourse (a news traffic that immediately followed up the 
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traffic in commodities) were the prime movers of this. The bourgeois public 
sphere, by coming together in an unrestricted fashion, formed an unprecedented 
civil society not just to weaken absolutism but also to move away from the 
arbitrary decision making to install a rational authority that will take its 
decisions by public and open debate organized under certain laws. Elections, 
liberal constitution and civil rights before the law (free speech, right to 
assembly and fair trial) have been the consequences of this rational decision 
making public authority.  
Habermas cherishes the private realm as something that has to be 
defended against the domination of the state under all circumstances. In this 
realm, only the strongest argument has a chance of survival, as participants to 
the public sphere are accepted as equals. On equality of participants Habermas 
observes “a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality 
of status, disregarded status altogether” (Habermas, 1989: 36). This claim was, 
of course, an idealized narrative of the public sphere and one of the main 
criticisms that Habermas has later received to his theory in regard to exclusion 
and inequality of participants.  
Britain serves as the most suitable example of public sphere 
development as it is the first spot that put aside the institution of censorship. 
This elimination is “crucial to putting the public in a position to arrive at a 
considered, rather than merely a common, opinion.” (Calhoun, 1992: 14) It was 
also first in Britain that the political opposition started to exist without turning 
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to violence. Habermas relates this novelty to the emergence of critical debate of 
the public.  
After giving the account of the rise of the public sphere, he subsequently 
moves on to the fall of the public sphere where it “turns into what Habermas 
calls a manipulated public sphere in which states and corporations use 
‘publicity’ in the modern sense to secure for themselves a kind of plebiscitary 
acclamation.” (Outhwaite, 1994: 10, quoted by Lunt & Livingstone) In the 
idealized public sphere there was a strict separation between public and private. 
States, guarding their limits, did not penetrate the private realm to try to 
influence the people. Private organizations, on their part, were not assuming 
public power at that moment. In this era, the separation between the state and 
the society was starting to blur and that paved the way to the transformation of 
the public sphere.      
Habermas explains this shift by giving the account of the literary 
journalism in the second half of the 18th century where the editorial staff has 
started to become a crucial intermediary but the more important thing was the 
newspaper publisher’s change of role “from a vendor of recent news to a dealer 
in public opinion” (Karl Bücher, quoted by Habermas, 1974: 53)  
“Refeudalization” of the society has mixed up the boundaries between 
the norms private and public while rational-critical debate was replaced with 
the consumption of culture. By refeudalization he means that the public sphere 
went back to the feudal times in which creators and consumers of information 
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and opinions were not the same people, and public sphere’s only function was 
to “acclaim” the authority of certain opinions and information.  
In Habermas’ description of the decay of public sphere, the birth of the 
modern welfare state plays an important role. In a process that dates back to 
1870s the tension in the self understanding of the bourgeois public sphere 
between homme and bourgeois allowed for a multitude of social groups gaining 
political rights and access to the public sphere. “As a result, it was no longer 
possible to ignore the inequalities and injustices in society, and the state was 
now called upon to ameliorate these.”  (Thomassen: 44) This results in breaking 
down of the division between state and society and to the introduction to the 
realm of the welfare state. Thus, the public opinion that’s hitherto been reached 
by intensive rational debate has turned into a negotiated compromise among 
those different interests:  
“The process of the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power 
now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest 
associations, parties, and public administration. The public as such is included 
only sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is brought in only to 
contribute its acclamation” (Habermas, 1989: 176)  
The decomposition of the public sphere is further realized by a passive 
culture of consumption and an apolitical private sociability of the new 
individual. Habermas contextualizes these two elements as somewhat related to 
each other. The new public sphere is made out of individuals who spend their 
income to different products. Their consumption choices are guided by 
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advertising that “is aimed at the masses as made up of individual, ‘private’ 
consumers who do not need to communicate with one another in order to 
consume.” (Thomassen: 45)  
Habermas’ critique of the mass culture is not at all at odds with the 
Frankfurt School. He finds the decomposed public sphere, depoliticized and 
impoverished very much by the removal of critical discourse. (Calhoun, 1992: 
24) The consumers of opinions or information are almost always passive and 
exemplified by the TV watching masses that does not react to anything in any 
case.  
The refeudalization thesis is present in the functioning of politics as 
well. The mass political parties are hierarchically bureaucratized and for this 
reason can not be influenced from bottom to top. Also, the rulers of these 
parties try to manipulate the public sphere to gain the votes of the citizens. 
Public sphere is not contested by only politicians but by other state actors and 
corporations as well. On the other hand, “the role of the citizens is reduced to 
that of acclaiming, or not, what they are presented with, whether in the voting 
booth, when shopping, or with the remote control.” (Thomassen: 46) The only 
occasions in which they can react are the plebiscites. But it is worth noting that 
even in plebiscites; the citizens, on their decision-making, rely on the 
information produced by spin-doctors. 
In this final stage and by the way of these transformations the public 
sphere becomes a stage for advertising and loses its rational-critical edge “by 
seeking to instill in social actors motivations that conform to the needs of the 
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overall system dominated by those states and corporate actors.” (Calhoun, 
1992: 26) In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, his solution to 
the present decayed status of the public sphere is setting “in motion a critical 
process of public communication through the very organizations that mediatize 
it” (Habermas, 1989: 232) His proposal is firstly to democratize associations 
and institutions and using them as the main blocks of the revitalized public 
sphere. Although he doesn’t go into much detail on how he’s going to realize 
this Calhoun finds him “persuaded more by his account of the degeneration of 
the public sphere than by his suggestions of its revitalization through 
intraorganizational reforms.” (1992: 32) 
II.I.II. Plaintiffs at work: Public sphere theory criticized 
Although Habermas’ public sphere theory is a widely used formative 
theory for social sciences and media studies, it’s not an unchallenged one, 
especially on the account of history, political analysis (his ideal of a direct 
democracy functioning in a territorial nation state has been found out of fashion 
with regards to modern society and cross-border communication flows) and, his 
“apparent blindness to the many varieties of exclusion (based on gender, class, 
ethnicity, etc.)” (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013: 90)  
One of the most common and main critique that Habermas has received 
is how he ignored the biases and exclusions in the bourgeois public sphere and 
how he has managed to keep his idealization of the heyday of the public sphere 
while the press at that time also included gossip, scandal, disinformation, 
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limited access and so on which were “hardly conducive to the rational debate 
that he is after” (Thomassen, 2010: 48) 
Feminist scholars were influential in pointing out the crooked aspects of 
the public sphere by underlining the insufficient attention paid by Habermas to 
the patriarchal structure of the idealized public sphere. They argued that being a 
man was identical to being a human being but the same thing cannot be said 
about the women in bourgeois public sphere.  
Furthermore, as the bourgeois public sphere presented a “stylized 
picture of the liberal elements of the bourgeois public sphere” (Habermas 
1989a: xix) and should have contained diversity, debate, tolerance and 
consensus. But in actual fact “the bourgeois public sphere was dominated by 
white, property-owning males.” (Kellner: 267)  
Habermas has also been criticized in his negligence of the plebeian 
public sphere in The Structural Transformation Of the Public Sphere. He 
argued on the book’s introduction that he purposely ignored the plebeian one to 
focus on the bourgeois public sphere and “the plebeian public sphere must be 
understood as derivative of the bourgeois public sphere.” (Thomassen, 2010: 
49)  
II.I.III. Let the philosopher out talk himself: Habermas revises 
Habermas’ ignoring of other public spheres has been criticized as being 
overly holistic since it disregarded the demands of other parts of the society. 
This has pushed Habermas to revise his views on Calhoun’s edited volume on 
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public sphere (1992) where he has admitted that there is not only one public 
sphere but many overlapping and conflicting public spheres. He realigned his 
view on this by declaring that “from the beginning a dominant bourgeois public 
collides with a plebeian one” (1992: 430) and that there is obviously a certain 
“pluralization of the public sphere” (426) and “competing public spheres” 
(425).      
Habermas has been, furthermore, criticized by being extra pessimist 
about the present “refeudalized” state of the public sphere and being deeply tied 
to the Frankfurt School’s view on cultural industries. As mentioned above 
Habermas, by overlooking the potential of non-bourgeois public spheres such 
as the plebeian one sees degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere as a 
catastrophe and “if Habermas had paid more attention to alternative public 
spheres, the decline and disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere may not 
necessarily be such a loss” (Thomassen, 2010: 50) provided that there were 
alternatives to it.  
Moreover, Calhoun points out to the lack of social movements in The 
Structural Transformation Of the Public Sphere. (1992: 36-37) Habermas, in 
his later work not only acknowledges the role played by social movements in 
the last half of the century (1992: 425) but reformulates his theory of 
deliberative democracy by developing a more positive role for the public 
spheres, especially in Between Facts and Norms that he wrote in 1996. 
(Thomassen, 2010: 51)  
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In these later works, Habermas reassigned public spheres a more central 
role in the political system by speaking of weak and strong publics. The weak 
publics are civil in foundation and they provide the opinion and identity 
formation such as citizens’ daily debating of issues related to them. Strong 
public on the other hand are characterized as the public in parliament. Members 
of the parliament do not just argue and debate, but they pass laws according to 
their discussions. Habermas claims that strong publics can be fed by the weak 
publics. This circulation of the communicative power might be the solution to 
the problems if the public spheres can “lie in better communication, that is, 
better conditions for participants to engage in a domination-free, rational 
dialogue.” (Thomassen: 52)  
II.I.IV. Fraser spots huge gaps 
Nancy Fraser, in 2007, argued that all the critics of public sphere theory 
disregarded the theory’s Westphalian framework and although their critiques 
were right in the lack of legitimacy and efficacy in Structural Transformation 
they took for granted that public opinion was addressed to a territorial state. 
Fraser insisted that the theory needs to reformulate itself and it’s area of 
coverage to be able to critically grasp the present era.  
She declares six assumptions of the public sphere theory that has now 
become obsolete in the face of increasing globalization and cross-border 
activities. (1) The sovereignty of a national state is contested by the global 
organizations, intergovernmental networks and NGO’s such as International 
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Atomic Energy Agency, the International Criminal Court, World Intellectual 
Property Organization, etc... (2) Then, after laying out new phenomenas such as 
“migrations, diasporas, dual and triple citizenship arrangements, indigenous 
community membership and patterns of multiple residency” she states that for 
many observers, for instance Calhoun (2002), post-Westphalian publicity 
appears “to empower transnational elites, who possess the material and 
symbolic prerequisites for global networking” (Fraser, 2007: 16) A territorially 
based (3) national economy is contested with the presence of outsourcing, 
transnational corporations and offshore business. While the assumption that the 
public opinion is carried out through a national communications infrastructure 
(4) is contested by “corporate global media, restricted niche media and 
decentered Internet networks”, she asks the question of “how could critical 
public opinion possibly be generated on a large scale and mobilized as a 
political force?” (2007: 18) The necessity of a (5) single national language and 
an Andersonian shared social imaginary which flourishes in (6) a national 
vernacular literature are the final obsolete assumptions for a public sphere to 
function.  
Fraser further debated transnational public sphere’s neglected questions 
that should be of central importance to critical theory. First she asked if such a 
sphere is inclusive enough to provide access to all those affected. Her second 
concern was about the participants status as peers or unequals and lastly the 
inquiry of participants’ likelihood of effecting political decision making were 
missing in the debates on/around transnational public spheres. Transnational 
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public sphere becomes questionable on these grounds on whether it creates new 
forms of exclusions, or not. 
II.II. How do you like your communication? Global, 
transnational or cross-border? 
II.II.I. The G word 
The word “globalization which is now used critically or uncritically by 
almost everybody, was hardly used by anybody in the early 1980s.” (Rantanen: 
2008) So how can one define this catch-all word and is it still a relevant concept 
or approach for understanding today’s complex structures and flows? 
The social scientists/philosophers of the last 15-20 years were busy 
discussing what to make out of globalization often in conflicting and sometimes 
in praising ways. Before going any further a need to differentiate globalization 
tendencies in different arenas must be fulfilled. Appadurai (1990) did this by 
laying out different scapes of finance, technology, culture, migration and 
ideology, arguing that they are globalized in different amounts and ways. This 
might serve as a starting point in the differentiation of profit seeking 
transnational companies’ quest for power and the millennial promises of cross-
border flows. 
Straubhaar broadly defines globalization as “the worldwide spread, over 
both time and space, of a number of new ideas, institutions, culturally defined 
ways of doing things, and technologies.” (2007: 81) Giddens (1991) outlines 
four major areas of globalization as multilateralism, global division of labor, 
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spread of capitalism and military alliances. He further underlines “the 
intensification of worldwide social relations [of] distant localities in such a way 
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa” (:64). Tomlinson’s (1999) definition of “globalization refers to the 
rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and 
interdependencies that characterize modern social life.” (:174, quoted by 
Straubhaar, 2007: 81) 
Globalization can also be perceived as a tool to diffuse ideas and 
ideologies from some countries to others. An ideological-wise transmission 
would indeed mean the modernization and capitalism. Since Lerner’s (1958) 
developmental communication strategies of 1950’s communication 
technologies have been accepted as mobility multipliers for some. Although 
this modernization framework has now been discarded to some extent, western 
powers are still approaching to many parts of the world in similar vein. Thus, 
“one way to attempt to simplify the level of complexity which the 
intensification of global flows is introducing in the figuration of competing 
nation-states and blocs, is to regard globalization as an outcome of the universal 
logic of modernity” (Featherstone & Lash, 1995: 2, quoted by Straubhaar, 
2007: 83).  
This “intensification of relations” and changing nature of borders is 
made possible by technological advancements and fluidity of finances. Towards 
the end of the 20th century “a borderless media system has developed whose 
backbone is a global communication network comprising fibre optic pipes and 
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TV broadcast satellites. Its expansion is driven by the internationalization of 
media markets following deregulation and a worldwide integration of the media 
industry.”  (Chalaby, 2005: 30)  
Nation-states’ autonomies have been curbed to a certain extent by major 
changes in trade regimes. “In the 1980s, the United States spearheaded a 
worldwide policy shift of deregulation and liberalization, which opened the 
gates to a round of corporate consolidation in the following decade” (Chalaby: 
2005: 29) These gigantic firms have started to move beyond the countries of 
their origin as the new markets opened up. Companies like Time-Warner, 
Viacom and News Corporation are now active in different areas in many parts 
of the world. Advertising industry should also be mentioned in here as there is 
around 10 global agencies that ‘control more than 80 percent of global media 
billings’ (Tharp and Jeong, 2001: 111, quoted by Chalaby: 2005: 30).   
Starting from the 1970’s and early 1980’s satellite-based cross-border 
TV channels started to emerge. But the direct satellite broadcasting became 
commercially popular in the mid 1990’s. With the advent of satellite 
technology cultural imperialism thesis suggested that national identities will 
suffer heavily. Moreover, as “satellites can technologically cover a good part of 
the globe, many people expected them to produce a global village of the sort 
anticipated by Marshall McLuhan.” (Straubhaar, 2007: 120) Anticipations of a 
global village or dissolution of nationalism have not realized as of yet even with 
the introduction of internet. People’s choice of media consumption might 
depend on cultural proximity and asymmetrical interdependence and one-way 
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structures of media imperialism theories is not enough in understanding this 
phenomena. (Straubhaar, 1991)   
Furthermore, changing migration patterns and the innovative use of 
media by diasporas changed the nature of communication beyond borders. 
Diasporas are staying in touch with their homelands through media use and 
introduction of relatively affordable commercial flights.  
II.II.II. Raise your arms for the transnational communication 
In light of above mentioned points Chalaby in 2005 pointed out a need 
for a new paradigm in media studies and claimed that transnational is a more up 
to date and appropriate level of analysis than global.   
As a term, transnational has a merit over international in that actors are not 
confined to the nation-state or to nationally institutionalized organizations; 
they may range from individuals to various (non)profitable, transnationally 
connected organizations and groups, and the conception of culture implied is 
not limited to a national framework.  (Straubhaar, 2007: 105)  
In late 20th century the technological leaps in communications paved 
the way of global reach to many conglomerates. CNN certainly became global 
in scope. However, some globalizing firms such as SBS and Vivendi had to pull 
back operations in some regions after suffering heavy losses. This lack of profit 
in global scope have pushed global media companies to regionalization, 
adaptation of content and segmentation. Chalaby argued that these tendencies 
point out to a transnational pattern rather than global. (2005b) 
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The new era is also being characterized by the growing influence of 
non-western media companies. Many of these companies operate in a regional 
scale crossing borders of respective countries such as Globonews from Brazil or 
Zee News from India.  
On the other side of the scale, audiences are becoming more hybrid and 
transnational as well. Aksoy and Robins (2003) found that migrant audiences 
are not particularly looking for a diaspora-specific programming but rather 
something enjoyable or fun as any other audience. Diasporic identities are not 
simple or one sided in their nature that they have the opportunity of consuming 
different media material from different cultures. This transnational way of TV 
viewing habits put them in a place that “fosters a relationship to knowledge and 
experience that is moving beyond the frame of national society.” (Aksoy & 
Robins, 2005: 36) 
II.II.III. Cosmopolitanism: As it should be? 
Cross-border flows started with the telegraph companies’ and news 
agencies’ “international expansion” that connected different parts of the world 
in an unprecedented speed. The globalization stage is characterized by total 
“worldwide integration”. The distinguishing trait of the transnational era for 
Chalaby is cosmopolitanization. (2005b: 32) Beck’s (2002) definition of 
cosmopolitanization is “inner globalization” – “globalization from within the 
national societies”: “borders are no longer predeterminate, they can be chosen 
(and interpreted), but simultaneously also have to be redrawn and legitimated 
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anew” (:17–19 quoted by Chalaby 2005b: 32). Moreover, Beck points out to an 
epistemological turn that occurs “within an interpretative framework in which 
[...] ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ replaces the nationally centred ontology 
and imagination dominating thought and action” (2004: 132). While 
nationalism is perceived as exclusive, cosmopolitanism is most generally seen 
as universal and thus inclusive. 
It might be useful to get back to Habermas at this point, at least to his 
later work The Postnational Constellation, where he advocated for a political 
cosmopolitanism that through a global legal order will institutionally embody 
values of equality, solidarity and human rights, as well as the expression of a 
universal political consensus (2001). Like many other works of Habermas, this 
is inspired by “the cosmopolitan vision of Kant, which can be found in his 
writings on perpetual peace, and remains an authoritative approach within 
political cosmopolitanism. In Kant’s view, cosmopolitan law regulates not only 
the relation between states, but also the interaction between state and 
individuals.” (Nowicka & Rovisco, 2009: 5)    
Habermas’s (2001) vision of a cosmopolitan global public sphere has 
been criticized by Cheah (2006) for remaining in the neoliberal logic of 
capitalism, “especially with regards to the imbalance in power relations created 
by an allegedly cosmopolitan North that is sustained by global exploitation of a 
postcolonial South in structural conditions of deep inequality.” (Nowicka & 
Rovisco, 2009: 4)   
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II.III. European public sphere  
II.III.I. Much debate is the necessary rate 
Thomas Risse (2010) on the other hand touches the issue of 
transnational public sphere on a different note, through europeanisation. 
According to him, the conventional wisdom that disregards the possibility of a 
public sphere when there is no common language, no widely used common 
(European) media and the lack of a consensus on the (European) project at hand 
is challenged by the transnationalization of national public spheres and 
collective identities. Transborder communication happens when same issues 
discussed in same time with similar frames of reference, that is, an awareness 
and recognition of different frames. Mutual observation across national spheres 
is another dimension of transborder communication meaning the degree to 
which national media regularly observe, report, comment about one another 
with regard to EU; and, of course, recognition of speakers from other countries 
as legitimate contributors, not foreigners. 
According to Risse public spheres are neither tangible nor given, and 
especially, they are “not out there waiting to be discovered by analysts”. (2010: 
110) All types of public spheres are social constructions and they can be 
conceptualized in many forms. His own construction of a European public 
sphere is in terms of “the Europeanization and transnationalization of national 
public spheres” and the communication in his conceptualization “does not 
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require consensus; conflict and even polarization are necessary prerequisites for 
lively public debates” (2010: 108) 
While it is evident that most national public spheres are fragmented, the 
same can be said about the transnational public spheres. Thus, Risse by 
claiming that “to assume, however, that national cultural barriers are 
insurmountable, while regional, class, or gender barriers are not, is hard to 
defend” (112) is seeking construction of a normative transnational public 
sphere. He then lays down two normative requirements for a public sphere in 
liberal democracies as “openness to participation” and “the possibility of 
challenging public authorities to legitimate their decisions.” (p. 115) While the 
former was also included in Nancy Fraser’s work (2007) as mentioned above, 
the latter can be seen as the substitute of the “likelihood of effecting political 
decision making” in the same work.  
II.III.II. Can I get my European to go? 
Debates on European public sphere revolves around it’s particular 
nature. As it is “neither a state nor a nation” (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007: 12) 
it should definitely be different from a national public sphere. European public 
sphere is a transnational public sphere and it does not necessarily need a 
transnational media to exist as explained in detail above in Thomas Risse’s 
definition of European public sphere. Of course Risse was not the only scholar 
who wrote on europeanization through national media. There were others like 
Eder and Kantner who spoke of “a pluralistic ensemble of issue-oriented 
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publics that exists once the same issues are discussed simultaneously and within 
a shared frame of reference” (Lingdenberg, 2006 quoted in Gripsrud, 2012) 
We have already mentioned that Habermas revised his views in Between 
Facts and Norms to include a more complex understanding of public spheres 
that “branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, 
regional, local, and sub cultural arenas” (1996: 373) European public sphere has 
been conceived as an open space for the issues that surpass national borders of 
the states for the citizens and political elites. Habermas claims that the public 
sphere is not one big forum of discussion but many overlapping, intersecting 
and sometimes independent network of forums 
from the episodic publics found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets; 
through the occasional or “arranged” publics of particular presentations and 
events such as theatre performances, rock concerts, party assemblies, or 
church congresses; up to the abstract  public sphere of isolated readers, 
listeners, and viewers scattered across large geographic areas, or even around 
the globe, and brought together only through the mass media.  (374) 
Any public sphere is constituted by different layers of public 
communication. The transnationalization of public spheres might as well be a 
gradual and multidimensional process. Thus, the suggestion that “the 
establishment of transnational media could be regarded as one dimension of a 
transnational public sphere.” (Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 695) 
become a reasonable one. 
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After the dissolution of initial stages of a transnational media that 
existed in the 18th century in Europe with the availability of cross-border 
newspapers that were available in salons and cafés across the continent 
(Darnton, 1995 cited by Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg). The introduction of 
nation state as the main political constituent and implementation of borders in 
19th century led to the discontinuation of the European public sphere until the 
1980’s where technological and policy-wise changes set the scene for the 
emergence of transnational media. The former relates to satellite broadcasting, 
introduction of Internet and more recently online and digital publishing 
possibilities and the latter is the opening up of markets to private conglomerates 
who want to broadcast across the borders.  
II.IV. What is news? 
Any public sphere is fueled up by media. News media is especially 
important when it comes to political public spheres as, normatively, news 
provide essential information for a citizen to make her/his decision firstly about 
various current topics that are said to be important for the society and 
eventually on whom s/he votes for. But of course this definition is a nation-state 
centred definition; since many members of migrant communities don’t have the 
right to vote where they live. We will come to that later but first, let’s try to 
come up with a basic definition of news.  
II.IV.I. No news is good news 
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Jason Salzman’s quotes of Leon V. Sigal can help us make a 
provocative entrance to the subject: “news is what's in the news” and “what is 
newsworthy is what attracts an audience”. (Vissol: 47) While these are not 
soothing definitions at all they certainly point out to ephemerality of any 
definition of news as it is. What’s decided to be on the news and what’s left out 
is a conundrum at best.  
In the late 70’s sociologists like Herbert Gans, Philip Schelsinger, and 
Gaye Tuchman were able to show “how journalism was less a transparent 
‘window on the world’ than the product of series of practices and routines.” 
(Lewis: 81) The innocence of news is highly susceptible and media studies try 
to detect malfunctions and make a sense out of the endless flow of news.  
Audience company EBU defines information in news, news magazines, 
documentaries and current affairs as:  
programme intended primarily to inform about current facts, situations, 
events, theories or forecasts, or to provide explanatory background 
information and advice. Information programme content has to be non-
durable, that is to say that one could imagine that the same programme would 
not be transmitted e.g. one year later without losing most of its relevance. 
(quoted in Vissol: 47) 
One thing that catches the eye in the above description is the makeshift 
nature of news. Rantanen  in his When News Was New argued that news has re-
invented itself as something “new” in various media all through history. In her 
analysis, “the key term is ‘disposable news’, a form of built-in obsolescence 
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that serves a profit motive but impedes public understanding of the world.” 
(Lewis: 83) The temporal limit that define what news is might have a twofold 
outcome.  
Firstly, news items generally don’t give any historical background 
fearing that it might endanger temporality of the news items since the news 
items should stay in the borders of recent developments. Secondly, the news 
items rarely focus on what might come next after a certain event or give its 
audience different perspectives and background information that can inform the 
public and provide basis to an informed audience. This creates a certain forced 
continuity in news that readers/viewers have to abide to. As an illustration, one 
cannot dare to apprehend Israeli-Palestinian conflict by just consuming, for 
example a couple of news items about the Israeli construction of new 
settlements in West Bank as the issue goes back to many topics and historical 
facts such as the birth of zionism, Holocaust, Millet system, two state solution, 
Arab nationalism, etc... 
 
II.IV.II. Dual filter system: “Distortion is the norm” 
Thomas Meyer’s (2002) Dual Filter System of the Media is a useful 
concept as it accepts any news item as a strained version of an original fragment 
of a political reality. He talks about the limited capacity of media “to transmit a 
full and complete picture of the nearly limitless wealth of events that comprise 
political reality, so they always have to pick and choose what they will feature 
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and how they will present it.” (:46) While translating real events into media 
products, the media apply two different filter systems which distorts a pre-
selected “reality”. “The more of these reportage factors that apply to an event, 
the higher will be its expected newsworthiness, and the more likely the media 
will pay heed to it.” (:46) This mechanism that unconsciously pushes the 
journalists to select an issue over the other in the name of “newsworthiness” is 
“a tacit professional consensus”. (:29) 
TABLE 1 - Thomas Meyer’s Dual Filter system 
Meyer calls the second filtering “rules of stage-managing” (logic of 
presentation) which deals with how this political reality that made it through the 
first filtering system will be presented and theatricalized by the media to attain 
a final product, -article, TV report, etc. These rules are picked up from the 
codes of theater performance and the discourses of popular culture such as 
story-telling, personification, conflicts of mythical heroes, drama, archetypal 
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narratives, verbal duels, social-role-dramas, actions with symbolic overtones, 
entertainment artistry, and news-reporting rituals that promote social 
integration. (:47)  
Personification casts natural persons as embodying “qualities, forces, 
tendencies, virtues, programs or powers that carry powerful resonance in a 
country’s political culture and mythology.” (:32) Meyer argues that Tony Blair 
and Gerhard Schröder has been portrayed as men of will, virtue, innovativeness 
and the “can-do” spirit, “regardless of the actual content of programs they stood 
for.” (:32) Drama is another pattern borrowed from theater. News items “depict 
a tragic conflict between persons, whether heroic or not, driven by fate toward a 
denouement that leaves behind only the victors, the vanquished, and the 
failures.” (:32) Archetypal narratives in news items are the stereotyped 
characters that are heavily present in both theatre and arts such as the friend and 
the enemy, the ruler, the good guy, the bad guy, the traitor, the innocent, the 
expert, the up-and-comer, the powerful and the powerless, “all in the shape of 
known and unknown political actors.” (:33)  
Meyer further points out the existence of appearances, gestures toward a 
real event albeit one that never actually takes place in the real world of politics. 
To illustrate that he gives the example of highly publicized visits of Ronald 
Reagan to schools, while at the same time it was his administration that cut the 
education budgets. (:34) 
II.V. 24-hour news television is rolling without hesitation 
28 
 
II.V.I. Rolling News 
In the television universe news are presented in two different settings. 
The first one is the dedicated news hours (i.e. evening news) in generalized TV 
channels. These channels do not usually try to present news in all times of the 
day, especially in the absence of a major event. On the other hand, news 
televisions have an unwritten commitment to present news by the hour (and for 
many, on the half-hour as well). A fresh development is expected to be “first” 
on these networks. These news networks are available to viewers in most public 
spaces, in cable and satellite TV and ready to be consumed in a relentless 
fashion.  
After the advent of satellite TV and emergence of a multitude of 24-
hour news channels many high-ranking officials have pointed-out the need to 
feed never-ending needs of real-time television news. Former UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair used one of his final speeches to warn the dangers posed 
by 24-hour news cycle: “In the 1960s, the government would sometimes, on a 
serious issue, have a Cabinet lasting two days. It would be laughable to think 
you could do that now without the heavens falling in before the lunch on the 
first day. Things harden within minutes. I mean, you can’t let speculation stay 
out there for longer than instant.” In a similar tone US President Barack Obama 
underlined how political decision making have been affected by the rolling 
news mentality: “Too many in Washington put off hard decisions for some 
other time on some other day...an impatience that characterizes this town-an 
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attention span that has only grown shorter with the 24-hour news cycle...” 
(Cushion & Lewis p. 2-3) 
These statements might be accounted as the stress of under-heavy-
scrutiny politicians but there are many on the other side of the picture who feel 
the same way. American journalists Howard Rosenberg and Charles Feldman 
see a parallelism between 24-hour news cycle and never-ending pace of modern 
life when they claim that the desire for rolling news is much like the desire for 
“drinking instant coffee while listening to instant analysis of instant polls. It 
includes not only speed dialing and speed reading, but speedier dialing and 
speedier reading, living life by stopwatch, cramming and more into less and 
less. We want faster food and faster orgasms” (Rosenberg & Feldman, 2008: 18 
quoted by Cushion & Lewis: 3) 
CNN, the first dedicated news channel is launched in 1980. Around 30 
years later, by 2009, while CNN was potentially available to 2 billion people in 
over 200 countries, European countries had an average of 21 24-hour news 
channels to choose from. In countries like France, Germany and UK, the figure 
is much higher. In total, Europe had 160 national and international news 
channels in 2009. (Bromley, 2010: 35)  
Using McLuhan’s notions of a global village as a starting point many 
researchers heralded a definitive arrival of globalization with the advent of 24-
hour news channels on satellite. Along these researchers, Tomlinson argued the 
importance of the “deterritorializing” effect (1999) and Volkmer (2003) pointed 
out that the ability to simultaneously broadcast around the world and bring 
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them on a same page during key moments is a sign of an emerging “global 
public sphere” and lays cosmopolitan foundations of citizenship. Furthermore 
existence of contraflows like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya and intensifications of 
flows and interpenetration is proof enough for others who see a rightly 
globalized world such as Held and McGrew’s Great Globalization Debate 
(2003). (Rai & Cottle: 52)  
On the other hand, many theorists such as McChesney and Boyd-Barrett 
take up the issue with a traditional geo-political economy approach passing 
through cultural imperialism thesis. Thussu (2003) feels that while the growth 
of regional news stations is a direction towards democratization, what really 
happens is a cross-border “CNNization” of television news. So rather than 
pushing for a “global public sphere”, these regional news stations bring off a 
standardization of “US style” journalism and homogenization of news 
structures and forms around the world. (Rai & Cottle, 2010: 52)  
After putting down these two positions of global public sphere and 
global dominance on satellite news landscape Rai & Cottle contends that there 
is evidence to support both positions (74) rather than a homogenous format 
among various 24-hour news channels. At a transnational level they go along 
with the likes of Boyd-Barrett, McChesney, Thussu and evaluate that the 
“ownership and reach lend credence to traditional political economy arguments 
underlining the continued supremacy of major Western players” (75).  
On the other hand there is surely multi-directional flows, regional 
“mini-imperialisms” and newly empowered minor media players from 
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Singapore, Middle East, etc. (75) Furthermore many 24-hour news televisions 
emerged in the national borders recently. For instance, in Turkey’s private 
Digiturk satellite platform there are 16 Turkish and 6 English language 24-hour 
news televisions as of date.
1
 Another trend is the surfacing of publicly financed 
news networks from different parts of the world such as Iran’s Press TV, 
Russia’s RT, France’s France24 and so on...   
II.V.II. Who’s interested in news that criss-crosses borders? 
Many transnational television channels are 24-hour news stations. 
Although there are special interest channels like MTV and Eurosport. CNN 
International, BBC World News, Euronews, Sky News, Deutsche Welle TV, 
France 24 and Al Jazeera English are the notable rolling news channels. CNBC 
and Bloomberg are financial news channels.  
Television remains as the big and powerful medium even after the huge 
growth of Internet and it is still the medium where most people get their news 
most of the time. (Lewis, 2010: 92) Yet, although pioneering 24-hour news 
networks like CNN and BBC World now have the ability to broadcast a 
common set of programming simultaneously to different markets around the 
globe, audience numbers stayed low compared to national programmings. In 
many regions, “cultural and linguistic barriers proved to be particularly 
resilient, and the needs and preferences of different audiences increasingly 
varied.” (Rai & Cottle, 2010: 71) Straubhaar explains limited access to 
                                                 
1
 http://www.digiturk.com.tr/kanal/tumkanallar/ 
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transnational television networks with Bourdieu’s (1984) cultural capital. 
Bourdieu found that schooling and cultural experiences directly influence 
cultural capital that people acquire. So he proposes that there is, indeed, a 
correlation between the size of cultural capital and the choice of music that a 
person can enjoy. Applying this logic to television Straubhaar contends: “Those 
with less economic or cultural capital are more likely to choose local, national, 
or regional material, which is easier for them to understand.” (Straubhaar, 2007: 
92) 
Transnational news networks like CNN is followed by two groups: 
First, a globalized elite who speaks English and interested in CNN’s 
perspective of events and secondly, people in the Anglophone countries of the 
world who are already used to consuming television content from the US. 
(Straubhaar, 2007: 125) In 1998, Sparks found that the actual audiences for 
BBC Worldwide and CNN were quite small to be considered as a potential 
“global public sphere”. Similarly transnational televisions have not acquired no 
more than two percent of the cumulated audience shares in European national 
markets. (Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 698)  
Euronews reaches 5.38 million people in Europe each day (2.7 million 
cable and satellite viewers and another 2.7 million viewers coming through its 
national windows broadcast) while CNN International and BBC World News 
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reach 1.4 million and 844 thousand viewers a day respectively.
2
 (Euronews, 
2012) These numbers remain small compared to general interest television 
stations but their audience, while small, tends to include Europe’s political and 
economic elite. However, they are appreciated by the more educated socio-
professional categories and the audience share can reach up to 50% of that 
universe in surveys such as European Media Marketing Survey (EMS) that 
concern the consumption of the 20% richest households in 16 Europeans 
countries. (Vissol, 2006: 54) 
Despite the fact that audience numbers for transnational television is 
small, looking at EMS results their audience numbers is increasing in size, at 
least in elite categories. EMS European audiences in terms of reach, which is 
defined as the number of people having seen at least once a specific programme 
or spot over a defined period (daily, weekly or monthly). Table 2 shows the 
weekly reach – the industry standard – of our chosen Pan-European TV 
channels over the last 12 years in the EMS universe. 
The universe of the largest EMS survey measures the habits of 
“Europe’s most affluent consumers and top business decision makers” of 21 
European Countries. This top universe is chosen on the basis of income and it’s 
size is about 49 million individuals (13 per cent of the total population).  
                                                 
2
 Euronews is a multilingual news channel that broadcast 11 languages simultaneously 
compared to anglophone broadcasters like CNN Int. and BBC World News and it was not 
possible to reach audience numbers for Euronews in English.  
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TABLE 2 - PETV Weekly Reach in EMS Regular Universe of 40 million 
Europeans, 1996-2007 (in percentage of viewers within this universe) 49 
million people includes the top income earners of 21 European Countries in 
2012 
This is also observable in the increase in advertising revenues, that is up 
from 31 million in 1988 to 628 million in 2002. “This 20-fold increase should 
be compared to the 2.5-fold increase in total television ad-revenue during the 
same period.” (Vissol, 2006: 53) 
To sum up, while transnational communication space in Europe is 
growing and attracting influential elite audiences, “the role of transnational 
media in reaching out to the broader European public remains very modest.” 
(Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 707) Thus, a possible influence of 
political decision-makers from bottom to up remains as a normative ideal. This 
might be all the more important, for instance, for European citizens as many 
decisions that affect them has been taken on a transnational level, that is the so-
called Troika made-out of European Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and European Central Bank. (ECB) 
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Chapter III: Methods & Procedures 
III.I. The rationale 
In order to discuss the research questions mentioned above, coverage of 
an event with “transnational importance” is needed. In this case, the coverage 
on four 24-hour news networks of the summit on Eurozone debt crisis that took 
place on 7-9 December 2011 in Brussels will be analyzed. The chosen 
transnational news networks are Euronews, BBC News, CNN International and 
Al-Jazeera English. BBC News is known as a public service broadcaster from 
United Kingdom with a transnational perspective. Euronews is a eurocentric 
news network operating as Europe’s cross border public broadcaster with state 
owned shares mainly from France, Italy, Russia and Turkey. While CNN 
International is “frequently mentioned as the perfect example of a leading 
global medium that encourages exchange of political opinion worldwide” 
(Hafez: 12), Al-Jazeera English is seen as the only non-western global news 
network. These channels are further discussed below. 
The reason behind the choice of transnational 24-hour news networks 
lies in their claim to be global or transnational. After stressing the need of 
differentiation between quickly reporting from different parts of the world and 
the effort of explaining and reporting the world as a single place, Berglez 
(2008) concludes that “it is not possible to say that CNN International is, in all 
cases, more global in its outlook than a national newspaper.” 
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The data from the news networks is collected from a combination of 
YouTube accounts and own websites. Euronews
3
 and AJE
4
 uploads every news 
bulletin to YouTube as video clips. CNN has its own video hosting service
5
. 
BBCwn used to have a dedicated channel on Youtube but they closed it to 
move on their own website
6
. The week debuting from 5 December 2011 has 
been accepted as a starting point and all videos related to Eurozone debt crisis 
summit has been recorded as such. In total, 37 reports from Euronews, 17 from 
AJE, 40 from BBCwn and another 30 from CNNi has been taken into 
consideration. 
III.II. Critical Discourse Analysis 
Relations of power and dominance is the main point of inquiry for this 
study, primarily, because of the persistence of nation-state and secondly to look 
into what Fraser calls “exclusionary effects” (Fraser: 12) of transnational public 
sphere that blocks some groups’ access to representation and decision making. 
In a similar vein, Calhoun, contemplating on cosmopolitanism argues that   
In offering a seeming ‘‘view from nowhere,’’ cosmopolitans commonly offer a 
view from Brussels (where the postnational is identified with the strength of 
the European Union rather than the weakness of, say, African states), or from 
Davos (where the postnational is corporate) (Calhoun, 2002: 873) 
 
                                                 
3
 http://www.youtube.com/user/Euronews 
4
 http://www.youtube.com/user/AlJazeeraEnglish 
5
 http://edition.cnn.com/ 
6
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/video_and_audio/ 
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Building on that it’s important to hold discussions on discourse which is 
used as a tool for holders of power to naturalise their position and make it a part 
of natural order of things. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) was developed to open up texts and submit them into critique. 
By doing that, CDA stands out as a serious alternative to the quantitative 
methods of news analysis that provide an objective accounting of news content.  
 Van Dijk describes CDA as concerned with “the role of 
discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (van Dijk, 1993: 
249). Dominance is defined as the “exercise of social power by elites, 
institutions or groups, that results in social inequality” (van Dijk, 1993: 250). 
Van Dijk argues that “news media are elite forms of discourse and suggests that 
critical discourse analysis is particularly appropriate for news media because it 
plays such an important role in our everyday lives” (Polson & Kahle: 256-257) 
and because it is a form of social power in that access to (control over) news 
discourse is not equal to all groups and individuals in society (van Dijk, 1991: 
110). News media are one of the most important sources of discourse and, as 
van Dijk argues (and several studies have shown), “help to shape public 
perceptions of social and policy issues.” (Polson & Kahle: 257)  
CDA examines both the content and the form of news item including 
semantic aspects along with the text. Van Dijk summarizes the method as 
follows: 
Discourse analytical approaches systematically describe the various structures 
and strategies of text or talk, and relate these to the social, political or 
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political context. For instance, they may focus on overall topics, or more local 
meanings (such as coherence or implications) in a semantic analysis. But also 
the syntactic form of sentences, or the overall organization of a news report 
may be examined in detail. (van Dijk, 1991: 35)  
As a consequence, CDA will be used as method of analysis “to uncover 
the implicit or taken for-granted values, assumptions and origins of a seemingly 
neutral, self-evident and objective text, and relate it to structures of dominance 
and power.” (Berglez & Olausson, 2011: 38) CDA will be applied to not just 
the texts but to the use of images as well.  
III.III. Global news networks  
This section is dedicated to formations of and discussions about four 24-hour 
news networks that the data has been taken from. 
III.III.I. The originator: CNN International 
CNN was launched in 1980 as the first dedicated news channel ever. At 
that time, 1.7 million American homes had access to CNN. Thirty years later 
than that CNN is available to 2 billion people in more than 200 countries. Only 
after the development of cable television in mid-1980s the channel began to 
operate with profit, thanks to advertising revenue followed by cable 
penetration. (Flournoy & Stewart, 1997: 2 quoted by Cushion, 2010) In its 
initial launch, many found the venture as financially unconvincing because the 
channel had a limited budget to produce a 24-hour news agenda compared to 
well established networks like CBS, NBC and ABC that reigned the nightly 
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news audiences with greater budgets. So “to provide a sustainable economic 
model of broadcasting, CNN had to quickly stamp its editorial credentials on 
the genre of news and justify the existence of a dedicated television news 
channel.” (2010: 16)  
Over the years the channel developed extensive news gathering 
facilities. Although they closed down a couple of bureaux after the 2009 crisis, 
as of April 2013 CNN has 12 US based and 33 worldwide bureaux including 9 
in Middle East, 10 in Asia Pacific, 5 in Central/Latin America and 3 in Africa.
7
 
While CNN’s US headquarters is situated in Atlanta, Georgia CNN 
International (CNNi) is produced and broadcasted from different destinations 
such as London, Hong Kong, Mexico City and, since 2009, Abu Dhabi. CNN’s 
parent company Time Warner group runs joint news channels in Spain (CNN+) 
and Turkey (CNN Türk). 
CNNi’s founding goes back to 1985, albeit it became notorious with the 
first Gulf War where it provided live images of Baghdad under attack. “It was, 
in short, a global event and, for the genre of rolling news, arguably represented 
the moment when 24-hour television news ‘came of age’ and demonstrated the 
influence it could potentially wield.” (Cushion, 2010: 19) In time this has 
prompted many to voice their concerns about the possible wrongdoings of an 
ever influential global news network. This has been known as “CNN effect”, 
“CNN curve” or “CNN factor” (Livingstone, 1997: 1) Cushion contends that 
rolling news channels might have affected policy making by turning it into a 
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televised live event, “a spectacle for viewers around the world to tune into to 
see humanitarian crisis unfolding 24 hours a day”. (2010: 20) “CNN effect” 
began to refer other manifestations of transnational communications later on.  
But, the more recent research neither proved, nor denied media influence on US 
foreign policy decision making as its “empirically difficult to assess.” (2010: 
21) 
CNNi remains as the leading 24-hour news brand in the world, as 
evidenced in the EMS results seen in Table 2. CNN sells the news that it 
gathers to its home market in the US. This helps CNN to make profit topping to 
their good earnings in advertising sales. It is useful to note that CNN is the 
world’s only news channel that makes a profit. (Chalaby, 2009: 175) However, 
the channel’s reporting is sometimes generally perceived as excessively western 
oriented. Furthermore, CNNi, as a symbol of globalization is  directly aligned 
to American imperialism or Western Supremacy for some scholars.  
III.III.II. A quasi public beast of the world: BBC World News 
BBC’s radio, World Service was for many decades an important source 
of communication along different countries and regions, putting in motion a 
transnational network. After it had established itself a reputation of balanced 
and impartial news making (Walker, 1992 quoted by Cushion) the quasi-private 
media company launched a news television in 1991 called BBC World Service 
News (renamed as BBC World in 1994 and BBC World News in 2008) with an 
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identical public broadcasting mentality. It reached soon enough to remote 
markets of the world and started to compete with CNNi. (Cushion, 2010: 21) 
BBC World News produces a single bulletin to broadcast in all available 
countries compared to BBC World Service Radio and websites that has 27 
versions in different languages.
8
 The first problem that comes to mind is the 
difficulty of selecting stories that can work well in different countries/regions as 
some stories necessitate additional background information for people who are 
not directly related to a certain part of the world in which the story actually 
belongs to. In presentation stories are made relevant by focusing on themes that 
can resound across borders. (Chalaby, 2009: 176)  
Overall, BBC World News is known as a news organization “that is 
remarkably aware of the globalized nature of the world and the cosmopolitan 
character of the human condition in the twenty-first century.” (Chalaby, 2009: 
178) Moreover, being the most trusted brand in elite audiences can be seen as 
another indicator of the powerful global brand. (175) Nevertheless, in a recent 
research Polson and Kahle found that while reporting on migration to Britain, 
BBC Online put forward a “complex and subtle racism that can be found in 
even the best attempts at objectivity, and in particular how such racism is 
masked by language of the ‘nation’.” (2010: 253) 
Furthermore, Cushion (2010b) suggested that “the race to be Britain’s 
most watched news channel” has pushed BBC World News (BBCwn) to 
provide more breaking news items and reporting of live action. BBC’s relaxing 
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of its editorial guidelines to allow reporters and anchors to be more speculative 
is a result of entering in competition with Sky News. This proves that market 
forces have an external influence even for a financially backed semi-public 
institution like BBC.   
III.III.III. This one had a pan-European mission: Euronews 
A project to develop a pan-European news service dates back to 1980s, 
but the desire to do so, grew over time with EU’s enlargement and growth in 
power. Euronews finally launched in 1993 “to convey a shared political, 
cultural, and linguistic image of European nation-states.” (Cushion, 2010a: 21) 
The existence of Euronews is also tied to an attempt to foster a European 
identity among European citizens. It was furthermore intended to have a PR 
function “to present news and European culture in order to encourage a better 
appreciation of Europe’s uniqueness and cultural wealth.” (Brüggemann & 
Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 703) 
Since its inception the channel’s shareholders and funding have been 
dependent on public broadcasters, although the channel started to make more 
profit out of advertisements and sponsorships in the recent years. European 
Union provides around 20% of Euronews’ expenses. Financing comes from 21 
national broadcasters that air the channel on their frequency and additional 
investments in the form of becoming a shareholder and sitting in the 
supervisory board. The latter has been recently realized by Russia and Turkey. 
In February 2009 TRT purchased 15.70% of the channel's shares and became 
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the fourth main partner making up the supervisory board with France 
Télévisions (23.93%), Italian RAI (21.54%), and Russian RTR (15.98%).9 
Although the channel was intended to create a pan-European public 
sphere along the vicinity of Europe, it’s broad availability made the channel “an 
alternative to CNNi’s American ‘window on the world’.” (Cushion, 2010a: 21) 
The alternativeness, of course, can be discussed in many levels as United States 
and European Union are rarely in disagreement in various issues. 
Based in Lyon, Euronews employs “over 400 journalists of 25 different 
nationalities” (Euronews, 2012) The channel doesn’t use anchors in its news 
presentation. Images that are acquired from various sources are dubbed in 11 
languages. This gives visuality even a greater emphasis than the other rolling 
news stations. “Commenting on images that may not be exclusive Euronews 
struggled for a long time to find it’s own editorial line and establish its 
repertorial authority.” (Chalaby, 2009: 179) But the choice of dubbing them 
over keeps the budget in a certain control for a channel that want to operate in 
11 different languages simultaneously. The voice-overing of images ties up the 
hands of the channel when it comes to live debates or interviews. “And the 
absence of talking heads on Euronews may add to the perception that the station 
is a bit remote from events.” (180)      
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III.III.IV. Another voice? Al Jazeera English 
In 1996, when Al Jazeera was founded exactly five years after the first 
Gulf War, nobody had expected it to be this successful for Arabic speaking 
Middle Eastern audiences. The channel had gained exclusive coverage rights 
from the war in Afghanistan just like CNN’s acquiring of iconic images of 
Baghdad under attack. But, “unlike the American news channel, its coverage 
revolved around Middle Eastern concerns and issues.” (Cushion, 2010a: 22) Al 
Jazeera’s following coverage of the US invasion of Iraq, too, contrasted with 
Western media outlets’ coverage. While Al Jazeera tried to put forward human 
sufferings of locals caused by the war, western outlets have concentrated on 
military operations. (22) Continuing to propose this different structure generally 
at odds with the western oriented 24-hour news stations “the rise of Al Jazeera 
on the world media scene represents a rupture in a hegemonic West-centric 
media order” (Zayani, 2010) 
After the immense success of Qatari network Al Jazeera on Arabian 
Peninsula, the network launched a separate English service in November 2006. 
Al Jazeera English (AJE) has around 1000 staff from more than 50 
nationalities.
10
 AJE is notable for its broadcast services in Doha, Kuala 
Lumpur, Washington DC and London so it can theoretically “follow the sun 
round the globe by broadcasting its news bulletin from where the world is 
awake.” (Chalaby, 2009: 178) 
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AJE with its different take on events and strong coverage of overlooked 
parts of the world such as Bangladesh or Tanzania and to the issues such as 
human rights violations and climate change certainly constitutes a global 
outlook. Chalaby puts AJE with BBC World News and CNNi into a list of news 
channels that “report the world to the world” (2009: 187) instead of a list with 
those “that tell stories within their borders” (such as Euronews and Sky News), 
and finally, those “that tell stories about their borders” (including Deutsche 
Welle, Russia Today and France 24) (2009: 173). This widely accepted 
classification, in a sense, ignores AJE’s dubious approaches towards various 
Middle Eastern countries such as Bahrain or how it almost always ignores 
human rights abuses in Qatar. 
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Chapter IV: Analysis 
IV.I. Treaty On Stability, Coordination And Governance In The 
Economic And Monetary Union  
Many countries in Europe have been seriously affected from the 2008 
crisis. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and, lastly, Cyprus were hit the hardest. 
The deficits in national budgets are seen as the main causes of the crisis. The 
Maastricht rule that has been put into play in 1999 by unanimous agreement of 
all EU member states to implement a fiscal policy that aims for the country to 
stay within the limits on government deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (60% of 
GDP). 
Financially strong countries; Germany, Italy and France were all 
amongst the first to break the Maastricht rule during the last decade, while 
Spain and the Republic of Ireland ran surpluses before the 2008 crisis. Since 
2008, peripheral economies such as Spain, Greece and Portugal had run big 
deficits, because their economies were in a bad shape, generating less tax 
revenues and requiring more unemployment benefit payments as their 
population grew older. 
 In December 2011 European Union (EU) leaders, in an attempt to avoid 
the continuation of the 2007-2008 credit crunch, sought an accord involving all 
the members of the EU. 17 countries that make out the Eurozone and 10 other 
European Union members make up that list. Representatives from these 
countries gathered in 8 December 2011 in Brussels to sign this new treaty that 
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will control budget policies first laid out in Maastricht treaty and impose 
penalties to those who run budget deficiencies. Germany and France wanted a 
disciplined, balanced budget golden rule that will be adopted by all; automatic 
sanctions if deficits exceed 3% gross domestic product; harmonisation of taxes 
for corporations inside the eurozone and a tax on financial transactions.  
 After lengthy talks in Brussels, “the Heads of State or Government of 
the Euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced 
architecture for Economic and Monetary Union”11. UK as a non-member of the 
Eurozone, vetoed the treaty. It is called a treaty but it is in fact an 
intergovernmental agreement because of the exclusion of Britain. UK’s refusal 
has been explained by Prime Minister David Cameron in the form of a failure 
to safeguard financial service regulations that would affect the City of London. 
He also said there were insufficient safeguards for the future workings of the 
EU single market. The key points of the treaty are: 
● A "balanced budget rule" to be incorporated into national legal 
systems, at constitutional level or equivalent; 
● European Court of Justice to check whether nations implement budget 
rule properly - it will fine them up to 0.1% of national output (GDP) if 
they fail to do so; 
● More automatic mechanism to force states to correct budget deficits - 
it will kick in unless a qualified majority of eurozone states vote 
against it; 
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● Plans for bond sales and all major economic reforms to be reported to 
EU institutions in advance; 
● Eurozone summits to be held at least twice a year; 
● Treaty to be signed in March and remain open to other EU countries 
that wish to join; 
● Aim is to incorporate it into EU treaties within five years of it taking 
effect. (“Q&A: EU Treaty to Control Budgets”)   
The agreement entails more than the fiscal details as these strict 
regulations are generally seen as a prolongement of harsh austerity measures 
imposed upon the countries who needed the bailout agreements. As the crisis 
grew unemployment rate has expended in Eurozone, especially in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal resulting many public employees to lose their jobs or an 
important part of their salaries while retirees’ pensions has been cut. Thus, a 
notable part of these societies feel that they are becoming culprits of the 
wrongdoings of big companies, banks, politicians and the Troika (an imagined 
consortium made out of powerful Eurozone countries, ECB and IMF). This has 
been evidenced in many widespread demonstrations. Having said that, it should 
be noted again that this research is not interested in what can be the real 
solution to the financial crisis. But the human cost of the crisis must make an 
integral part of this picture. 
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IV.II. Dual Filter 
IV.II.I. Logic of selection  
 As a set of rules Meyer’s dual filter system is present in most of these 
news items. The first filtering system that deals with the selection logic of 
events into news is present here to fortify importance of the event and 
eventually attract more audience. An event must contain a surprise value or 
conflict and/or serious harm to someone or great success of a person to find it’s 
way in the media. Being a supranational event the summit doesn’t normally 
require these to get media attention. But this kind of story telling is so much 
embedded into newsmaking processes that the reports can’t make without them.  
 Primarily, there’s the addition of surprise value in almost all four news 
outlets’ coverage of the event. The British veto is presented as a shocking news 
at least in AJE’s Impact of EU veto by UK and BBCwn’s Is Britain now 
isolated in Europe?. UK, as the country who doesn’t use the common currency 
has always situated itself a bit far from the other European countries. 
Furthermore, looking at David Cameron’s comments before the summit, the 
PM clearly states that they can veto the treaty. The harbinger of this veto is 
mostly visible in BBCwn (Eurozone crisis: PM vows to fight for national 
interest). Euronews also talks about this in the reports aired on December 2; 
“Britain’s interests” (Treaty changes must favour Britain says Cameron, 
Euronews); and in December 7 “Not all 27 members are singing from the same 
hymn sheet. Britain, although outside Eurozone opposes radical treaty change” 
50 
 
(Crunch time for the euro at vital Brussels summit, Euronews). BBCwn’s 
reporting before (Eurozone crisis: PM vows to fight for national interest) and 
during the summit shows a potential veto by David Cameron. in the news item 
aired while the summit is in session summarizes what the treaty proposal is 
about and segues to David Cameron’s short remarks just before entering the 
summit on “protecting Britain’s interests” and finishes the news item off with 
the following voiceover “the best protection would be an end to Euro crisis.” 
 The summit contains conflict as all but one member of EU decides to 
stay out of an agreement. 24-hour news networks, in their presenting bring this 
conflict further to a level of personal conflict, in this case between Prime 
Minister of UK, David Cameron and the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy. 
This personal conflict come into being in the form of snubbing at the Brussels 
meeting room. The images distributed from inside the meeting room shows Mr. 
Sarkozy chatting joyfully with one leader to another before ignoring David 
Cameron who passes right next to him. All four of the news networks use this 
image heavily. Euronews was by far the most frequent user of this image 
although it’s the only one that didn’t directly comment on the visual itself. 
CNNi states “See how David Cameron goes to shake hands but settles for a 
face-saving pat on the presidential arm” (EU leaders reach deal without 
Britain, CNNi). AJE reads “...and the British PM being given the cold shoulder 
by some in Europe.” (Britain more isolated than ever after treaty veto, AJE) 
and BBCwn “[...]a summit full of tension. The French President chipper. A 
British prime minister managing a clench smile as Britain’s relationship with 
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Europe changed too” (Is Britain now isolated in Europe?, BBCwn). What’s 
important here is BBC’s usage of “the president” and “a British prime 
minister”. For all three, the disregard of financial policies, cultural and 
historical differences between two countries, the imagined personal conflict 
between the two leaders and the depiction of David Cameron as the almost-
ridicule leader deserves a notice.  
 Serious harm/great success is, also, heavily ingrained in their reporting 
as the general consensus seems to be seeing the new treaty as a success and 
proposing that Cameron inflicted harm to UK and to the EU by rejecting the 
deal. Euronews is the network who underlines this the most by using words like 
“isolated”, “mistake” and “failed”. This “mistake” is presented as a personal 
mistake of David Cameron in Euronews: “David Cameron’s decision to veto 
the move” and BBCwn: “David Cameron’s decision to go it alone”. An 
identical expression, “leaving out in the cold” has been used by both Euronews 
(Cameron faces Commons after EU veto) and AJE (Britain more isolated than 
ever after treaty veto). 
IV.II.II. Rules of stage-managing 
There is certainly a theatricalization of the organization of the summit. 
In all 4 of the news channels we see European leaders arriving to the summit 
with black cars, before walking through the red carpet to go into the building 
where the summit will be held. On this short red carpet trip journalists take 
pictures and shout their questions to leaders. Leaders respond to these questions 
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in a manner that resembles actors attending to Oscars ceremony before they go 
into the Kodak Building in Hollywood. This is very much what Thomas Meyer 
describes in his Dual Filter System of the media under the second filter, the 
“rules of stage-managing”. 
AJE and Euronews use “family” as a figurative expression. While the 
presenter of Euronews mouths “almost perfect family” (Europe’s ‘27 minus 1’ 
agreement) over the EU leaders photo op, AJE has a more tale-like narrative: 
“Playing happy families at the end of a crucial summit in Brussels. [...] But like 
all families the European Union has its feuds and its black sheep.” (Impact of 
EU veto by UK)  
One of the most striking storytellings have been put forward by BBC 
when the channel starts of the news bulletin with Sarkozy rebuffing Cameron. 
The narrative then moves into leaders leaving the building at “4 in the 
morning”; most of them, especially Cameron looking very tired. Then, they get 
“2 hours of sleep” and come back to the meeting hall “at daybreak” only to find 
just enough time for reporting to the media. While Merkel gives her account of 
the British pull-out, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė shines as the only 
non-german, french or british leader who gets to speak, merely to point out 
David Cameron’s irrational behaviour: “Brits divided and they are outside of 
decision-making”. The news item ends with a “mood of Britain as the outsider 
extends to a ceremony welcoming Croatia as the latest EU member” with the 
announcer of the ceremony calling British PM to stage with these words: “now, 
last but not least UK, Mr. David Cameron”. (emphasis added) 
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AJE uses special effects to boost dramatic storytelling. The report kicks 
off with an almost story-like sentence over the images of vibrant sea: “Winter 
storms are battering British coastline...” that mixes into a map of Europe where 
the main British island slowly moves away from the continental Europe. The 
second special effect is done to illustrate proposals of a possible “two-speed 
Europe” where an AJE journalist speaks in the middle of two different roads 
with one road significantly more revved up than the other. The last one is the 
disappearance of David Cameron from the EU leaders picture. This report 
stands out from the others because of this usage of special effects. 
Personification is another theatricalization of the event sought by all 
four of the 24-hour news networks. Cameron is presented as under-fire leader, 
sitting by himself and drinking a glass of water tiresomely. (Cameron: Britain's 
better off outside the euro, Euronews; EU leaders win praise but euro doubts 
remain, Euronews; David Cameron’s decision to go it alone, BBCwn. CNNi 
has the most bizarre and despising attitude: “The pictures spoke volumes As 
Europe’s leaders chatted about closer ties Britain’s Prime Minister sat alone, 
isolated, next to the Maltese PM”. (EU leaders reach deal without Britain) On 
other news items Cameron is the one who has to defend his decision all by 
himself in a different space than the meeting room or the hall of the accustomed 
Brussels setting. This can remind some, of the quiz show Weakest Link, where 
the loser has to defend/comment on his performance after he has been 
eliminated by the unanimous decision of other players.  
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In addition to that, archetypal narrative of the winner/the loser has been 
used as well. BBCwn declares David Cameron “hopelessly outmanoeuvred by 
the French President.” and in an exclusive interview, a BBC journalist asks the 
following question to Cameron: “You compared the negotiations to a chess 
game but it’s checkmate to Sarkozy. What do you make of this?” The report 
also mentions Sarkozy leaving the summit smiling. (David Cameron’s decision 
to go it alone, BBCwn) Another report that clearly states the winners and the 
losers is by Euronews (EU leaders win praise but euro doubts remain). “The 
make-or-break summit has ended with Nicolas Sarkozy seen as a winner” the 
report read stating that “David Cameron was defiant in his isolation. [...] 
Angela Merkel succeeded [...] and Mario Draghi, the head of the ECB has been 
praised[...]”  
IV.II. Who gets to speak 
The questions that Fraser saw fit to any transnational public sphere 
stand out for this event as well. It is plain simple that in the coverage of the 
summit only few representatives of selected countries had a chance of 
explaining their views. These are Germany, France, UK and the President of 
Lithuania (on the basis of her public dismissal of David Cameron). The 
agreement touches all the signatories but only the mightiest have a chance to 
vocal what they think. Ms. Merkel’s interchangeable usage of  “we”, “the 
countries that signed the treaty” and “the Europe” is important. (Merkel hails 
Brussels “breakthrough”, Euronews) The other leaders are sometimes seen in 
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pictures to illustrate a cohesive EU that Britain selfishly opted out but neither 
their names nor their voices are heard. This answers the next question of are 
they represented as peers or unequals? CNNi’s usage of “David Cameron sat 
alone, next to the Maltese PM” constitutes the landmark in here as the most 
disdaining comment. On the other hand European bureaucrats such as the 
president of ECB and European commissioner find their way more than the 
leaders of other countries especially in Euronews. 
 Granted that representatives of most EU countries don’t utter a word in 
these reports, Ed Miliband, leader of the British opposition party speaks his 
mind in a comfortable fashion in Euronews (EU summit: Cameron tells 
Commons he acted in UK's interest) and BBCwn (David Cameron’s decision to 
go it alone). This constitutes a european public sphere in Risse’s definition as 
“speakers from other countries are accepted as legitimate contributors.” This 
might be linked to not missing out the opportunity of publicly denouncing 
David Cameron’s narrow-minded decision. 
IV.III. Singular(s) 
All of the four networks have dense similarities in their reporting around 
that time. They mainly focus on comments made by French, German and 
British leaders with the addition of some higher bureaucrats of European 
institutions. There are only a few reports that leave the plot behind. AJE’s 
European austerity increases immigration pictures a Greek diaspora prospered 
in Melbourne, Australia. In the report, the Greek community in Melbourne is 
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doing well, compared to people who stayed in Greece and they talk about a 
shortage of Greek speaking public workers to take care of the ageing 
community. 
 Human cost of the crisis is distinctly present in a report on Portugal in 
Euronews (Merry crisis from Portugal) and on Portugal and Greece in AJE 
(Europe's austerity bites before Christmas) where ordinary people talk about 
their hardships in fulfilling their needs and the future which they see as bleak.  
 Euronews’ Merry crisis from Portugal is particularly interesting as it 
voices a certain national discourse very highly as opposed to the general 
cosmopolitan inclination in most of the other reports. After describing a crisis-
hit Lisbon, the report moves to a Christmas market where almost every good is 
produced in Portugal. The manager of the market, proposes a national solution 
to economic hardships by declaring that “Portuguese people have to be more 
Portuguese. Local products will make the Troika leave the country as soon as 
possible.” National discourse, and David Cameron’s insistence on “Britain’s 
interests” has only been praised by the Tory Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, 
in BBCwn. Mr. Johnson’s approval of Cameron’s decision is linked to his 
insistence on “national sovereignty”. On the other hand, the most pan-European 
comment is heard from José Manuel Barroso, President of the European 
Commission. Mr. Barroso, before the summit declares that “All the world is 
watching us. And what the world attends from us is not more national problems 
but European solutions.” (Eurozone crunch time as EU heads meets in 
Brussels)  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
When something significant happens in the world, the international 
news TV channels are the first place the elite audiences and journalists around 
the world turns to because these stations have established themselves with 
access to places and key people. But their reporting and the transnational public 
sphere that they’re feeding into have problematic traits. 
The news items aired on four 24-hour news stations about the Eurozone 
crisis summit have major similarities. When implemented Meyer’s dual filter 
system, these news channels’ coverage of any event can be broken into 
different narrative structures. Logic of selection and rules of stage-managing 
laid out by Meyer is present in all four of news networks’ reporting. Logic of 
selection’s surprise value, conflict, and serious harm/great success are an 
integral determinant of its newsworthiness. The selection logic is so pressing 
that it affects how the news is presented per se. Rules of stage-managing, on the 
other hand, find their ways into all four news networks’ coverage. Findings 
suggest that, theatricalization happens to take less place in Euronews, since the 
channel doesn’t use humorous elements, special effects, and it uses techniques 
such as personification and storytelling only to a certain extent. 
Although not observable instantly, the distortion made by the dual filter 
system of the media is indeed there. A fragment of reality, which in this case 
can be unemployment or poverty, finds its way in media in a whole different 
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appearance than it actually is such as in the form of another country’s 
representative getting out of his/her car or a televised snubbing. 
Approached from Thomas Risse’s definition, the summit’s coverage on 
the global news networks does indeed contribute to the emergence of a 
European public sphere. Risse proposes that a public sphere is something that is 
constructed in the minds, not only in the times of harmony but also during 
conflict and even in polarizations. In the Eurozone debt crisis summit there’s 
exactly that: A conflict between UK and the powerful Eurozone countries and a 
personal feud between two heads of the state, -David Cameron and Nicolas 
Sarkozy. In this case, both countries’ citizens have a chance to listen to the 
speaker from the other country (Cameron or Sarkozy) as a legitimate voice. 
However, these channels’ claim is to be global and their attempt in 
bringing all the world’s news each with different perspectives does not add up 
when their reporting approach is highly similar. This similarity cannot only be 
explained by their reliance on news agencies or their ownership structure. An 
EU-wide summit in Brussels means that all the channels can afford sending an 
actual reporter to cover the event instead of aggravating the report from other 
sources. An explanation depending on the ownership structure stays afloat on 
the basis of existence of different ownership structures of each news outlet 
(semi-public, private, state sponsored and supra-nationally financed) that 
should have been in the end, resulted in a certain difference in the coverage. 
Of course, this similarity might be principally linked to the norms of 
news making processes and the mentality of 24-hour news networks, and 
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secondly, to the audience of transnational news networks. Elite audience’s 
numbers are small, compared to general television networks’ audience 
numbers. But, what is more important is their other features. They already tend 
to travel a lot (%22 of EMS Universe in Europe has seen 3 international 
airports in 2012) and, evidently, most of them speak the broadcast's publication 
language which is English. This audience is cosmopolitan by nature and the 
networks wouldn’t jeopardize losing their cosmopolitan outlook by putting 
other perspectives, as the latter comes with the risk of sounding too “national”. 
This argument can be fortified by the fact that each criticism to the summit has 
found its way to the transnational public sphere, in the form of national 
outbursts such as “national interests” or “kicking the Troika out”. 
Over and above that, this cosmopolitan outlook that they possess is not 
as cosmopolitan as it reflects. The most intense debate about the treaty change 
is whether the British will sign or not. The Franco-German plan has been 
presented with a built-in consensus. Not necessarily needing a multifaceted 
discussion. The transnational networks have legitimized France and Germany’s 
positions as the decision-makers. And the absence of all the other countries’ 
voices in the discussion accounts for their consent. 
The transnational public sphere that has been emerged around EU and 
come into being with the Eurozone debt crisis summit in December 2011 can be 
classified as not inclusive that consists of unequal participants, with a low 
possibility of influence on decision-making.  
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